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THE US beef industry operates in a highly competitive world market. As 
a global leader in the production of beef 
cattle, its competitive advantage in beef 
production stems from a well-developed 
infrastructure as well as a reputation 
for quality. Nevertheless, US beef has 
a disadvantage in the relative cost of 
production. For instance, the majority 
of US beef is grain-fed, while a pound 
of grass-fed beef can be produced at a 
lower cost. Lack of animal traceability 
and mandatory national identiϐication 
systems can also put US beef in a 
vulnerable position competing with 
other major export countries. There 
is no doubt that the US beef industry 
today faces a highly competitive global 
market place. However, are US beef 
exports facing signiϐicantly greater 
economic competition today than they 
did in the past, or have those export 
markets always been highly competitive? 
The beef industry has become more 
concentrated over the past 30 years, 
suggesting that examinations of export 
competitiveness should consider the 
possibility of market power. We also 
question whether global competition 
is affected by the inherent dynamics of 
cattle production and marketing in beef 
exporting nations. Livestock production 
is impacted by a biological cycle that 
affects the production of ϐinal meat 
products, and as cattle are capital and 
consumption goods, current breeding 
and consumption decisions impact 
future stocks. 
To test the general competitive 
efϐiciency of the United States and its 
rivals, we construct a model of revealed 
comparative advantage (RCA) based upon 
work by Balassa to investigate market 
dominance of the United States. The 
analysis is used frequently when looking 
for changes in a country’s trading status. 
Our constructed model shows how each 
exporter’s trade-weighted share of the 
export market has changed over time. We 
include variables for cattle inventories to 
explore the impact of stocks on RCA. 
To test for market power, we 
employ a model developed by Goldberg 
and Knetter, which has been used 
extensively in research on export 
markets. As in the RCA model, we 
incorporate livestock inventories into 
the model in order to ascertain whether 
market power has changed and how 
much these changes (if any) are due to 
the underlying inventories.
Based on the examination of 
trade ϐlows from 1994 to 2015, the 
eight largest importers of US beef 
are chosen for the analysis along 
with 11 major export competitors to 
the United States.2 Trade in animal-
derived products is often impacted by 
trade agreements and phytosanitary 
emergencies, which can change exports 
dramatically. A pertinent example is the 
BSE discovery in December 2003 and 
trade losses in many nations through 
2007 (Figure 1). In our simulations, 
we ask what markets would have 
looked like had such impacts not have 
happened in order to focus on the 
competitive aspects in the major export 
markets. Simply put, we are looking for 
evidence that competition changed for 
the United States with respect to its 11 
major competitors.
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The results for US comparative 
advantage are shown in Figure 2. A 
value of zero for lnRCA (RCA = 1) 
suggests that a nation has no more 
or less of a comparative advantage 
than its export competitors, positive 
values indicate greater comparative 
advantage and negative values indicate 
comparative weakness. The average 
for all exporters from the models’ 
simulations of the period from 1994 
to 2015 was not signiϐicantly different 
from zero. This means the overall 
average for the 11 competitors (and the 
United States) shows no comparative 
advantage when taken all together. 
Looking just at the United States, Figure 
2 shows that other than the South 
Korean import market (for which we 
believe the large values early in the 
data may be due to out-of-sample 
errors) the US comparative advantage 
is consistently near zero throughout 
the study. There are perturbations and 
ebbs and ϐlows on one side of zero or 
another, but for the most part (South 
Korea possibly being an exception), 
the US comparative advantage is no 
greater or lesser throughout the period 
of study. The underlying cattle cycle did 
have some impact, but did not seem to 
change the overall results very much.
The values in Figure 3 are Lerner 
indices, a measure of market power, for 
the United States in 6 major beef import 
markets. The cyclical changes in some of 
these measures indicate that the cattle 
cycle had some, but very little, impact 
in the international export market. In 
this test, a Lerner value that is zero 
or positive means one must assume a 
very competitive market. Based on the 
analysis of the 11 major competitors, 
we ϐind that although 60 percent of 
the indices show some market power, 
the overall average value is quite small 
(near zero) at -0.03: statistically, but not 
economically, signiϐicant. In particular, 
Figure 3 shows that most of the US 
indices are very close to zero and the 
Figure 1. US Exports to Selected Nations (January 1990=1.00)
Figure 2. Simulated lnRCA Indices for the United States, 1994-2015
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Figure 3. Simulated Lerner Indices for the United States, 1994-2015
United States would only be considered 
dominant in two markets: China and 
the Philippines. China, here, is probably 
an artifact of the simulations giving 
too much discretion to the potential 
for imports than reality, given that the 
United States has had an on-again, off-
again (and now, on-again) relationship 
with the Chinese market for beef. The 
Philippines would appear to have some 
US dominance, likely do to the historic 
relationship between the two nations. 
Overall, Figure 3 tells a similar story 
to Figure 2: there are times when the 
United States has market power (just as 
there are times when it has comparative 
advantage), but overall, markets are 
highly contested by all beef exporters 
and the underlying inventories have 
only a little impact.
The global beef market has always 
been highly competitive. A variety of 
tools are used to approach the question 
of whether the US export markets for 
beef are signiϐicantly more competitive 
today than they were in the past two 
decades and whether the underlying 
cycle of cattle stocks has impacted that 
1 The full study may be found online at 
Crespi, J.M., W. Hahn, K. Jones, L.L. 
Schulz, and C-T. Chen. A Study in U.S. 
Export Beef Competitiveness: Do Cattle 
Inventories Matter? ASSA Annual Meet-
ing. Chicago, January 5, 2017. https://
ageconsearch.tind.io/record/250113/fi les/
Export%20Beef%20Competitiveness.pdf .
2 The importing nations are Canada, 
China, Hong Kong, Japan, Mexico, Phil-
ippines, South Korea and Taiwan. The 
export competitors along with the U.S. 
are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, 
India, Mexico, New Zealand, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Paraguay and Uruguay. 
competition. The analyses lead us to 
the conclusion that US export markets 
for beef have always been and remain 
highly competitive for all beef exporters, 
including the United States, and that 
competitiveness is mostly uninϐluenced 
by underlying cattle inventories. 
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INTERNATIONAL TRADE and trade agreements have been a 
major part of the political discussion 
during the Presidential election and 
in the ϐirst few months of the Trump 
administration. From the withdrawal of 
the United States from the Trans-Paciϐic 
Partnership (TPP) to the ongoing debate 
about the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), trade policy is 
transforming and trade relationships are 
in a state of ϐlux. Currently, the United 
States has free trade agreements with 
20 countries, via 14 trade agreements 
(two multilateral agreements, NAFTA 
and the Dominican Republic-Central 
America-United States Free Trade 
Agreements [CAFTA-DR]; 12 bilateral 
agreements). Worldwide, there are 
currently 274 trade agreements 
in force, thus the United States is 
not involved in the vast majority 
of trade agreements. Countries in 
the European Union are involved in 
40 trade agreements, and several 
other countries are involved in 
more trade agreements than the 
United States (Chile 27, Iceland 29, 
India 15, Japan 15, Liechtenstein 27, 
Mexico 15, Norway 28, Panama 16, 
Peru 17, Singapore 22, South Korea 
18, Switzerland 29, Turkey 22, and 
Ukraine 17).
Trade agreements can cover or 
exclude various goods and services. 
The choice of goods and services 
covered are adjusted during the 
trade negotiations and agreed 
to by all parties. For the United 
States, agriculture has been a major 
component in most, if not all, trade 
Ag Trade and Trade Agreements
by Lee Schulz and Chad Hart
lschulz@iastate.edu; chart@iastate.edu
continued on page 11
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CURRENT NITROGEN and phosphorus applications in the 
Midwest have been connected to 
increasing water quality problems. 
In an effort to improve water quality, 
the Iowa Nutrient Reduction Strategy 
(INRS), a science and technology-based 
framework to assess and decrease 
nutrients to Iowa water and the Gulf of 
Mexico, was developed in 2013 (INRS 
2013). This framework advocates 
signiϐicant voluntary adoption of cover 
crops, which are planted between 
harvest and the planting of cash crops. 
While cover crops were utilized in the 
past to decrease soil erosion and b uild 
up soil organic matter, this technology 
has been revived recently due to its 
multi-functionality. Cover crops are 
very promising as they can reduce 
both nitrogen and phosphorus losses 
by around 30 percent (INRS 2013). 
The INRS proposes several scenarios 
to meet the N and P reduction goals 
including two in which row crop land 
cover crop adoption rates are proposed. 
Some Eastern states have recognized 
the importance of this practice such as 
Indiana, where 7.1 percent of farmland 
planted cover crops (Rundquist and 
Carlson 2017). 
Despite cover crops’ potential, this 
conservation practice has been adopted 
on a very small number of acres in 
Iowa. In 2013, there were just 300,000 
cover crop acres planted in Iowa (Soil 
and Water Conservation Society 2015). 
This number is miniscule relative to 
the total number of corn and soybean 
acres—around 23 million. Nevertheless, 
the number of cover crop acres has 
Cover Crop Adoption Decisions in Iowa: 
Insights from an In-Person Survey
by M. Jimena Gonzalez-Ramirez, Catherine L. Kling, J. Gordon Arbuckle Jr., 
Lois Wright Morton, Jean McGuire, Chad Ingels, and Jamie Benning
jimena.gonzalez@manhattan.edu; ckling@iastate.edu; arbuckle@iastate.edu; lwmorton@iastate.edu; jmc-
guire@iastate.edu; benning@iastate.edu
doubled in two years. In 2015, there 
were around 592,000 cover crops acres 
in Iowa, accounting for 2.6 percent of 
its farmland (Rundquist and Carlson 
2017). These adoption statistics show 
that substantial efforts will be needed 
in order to increase voluntary adoption 
and to reach adoption rates suggested 
by the INRS.
Given the potential of cover crops, 
a better understanding of farmers’ 
adoption decisions, incentives, and 
conservation barriers becomes 
necessary to effectively promote this 
conservation technology. We obtain 
a ϐirst glance on these items through 
an in-person survey, funded through 
the Iowa Nutrient Research Center, 
given to 38 farmers from three Water 
Quality Initiative priority watersheds 
and from one non-priority watershed in 
Iowa. The latter had an active farmer-
led watershed group from which 
interviewees were sampled. Among 
respondents, 25 used cover crops, 12 
were familiar with cover crops, but 
did not use the practice, and only one 
farmer was not familiar with cover 
crops. Thus, this small sample offers 
insights on farmers who are familiar 
with this promising technology. Among 
cover crops users, there was an average 
of 235 cover crops acres planted on 
both rented and owned land. Users 
reported cover crops on 140 owned 
acres relative to on 96 rented acres, 
illustrating different behavior between 
the two types of land. 
To understand farmers’ adoption 
decisions and incentives, the survey 
asked about the costs associated with 
this practice. Among users, the cost 
was roughly $28 per acre, while the 
cost was $25 among nonusers. Given 
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the voluntary nature of this practice, 
several farmers expect an incentive 
payment for establishing cover crops. 
The Environmental Quality Initiative 
Program (EQIP) offers payment rates 
that vary from $24 to $35 per cover 
crop acre, depending on the seed type 
(USDA-NRCS 2013). In 2013, the Water 
Quality Initiative offered $25 per acre 
(Swobdoda 2013). Farmers were asked: 
(a) “How much would a payment per 
acre have to be in order for you to try 
cover crops?” and, (b) “How much 
would a payment per acre have to be 
in order for you to adopt cover crops 
on your farm?” Seven farmers did not 
respond to either question, and two 
farmers did not know. For the ϐirst 
question, three farmers answered 50 
percent cost per acre, three answered 
zero, and two indicated that they tried 
on their own before incentives were 
in place. Among numeric responses, 
the averages were around $28 and $31 
for each question respectively. These 
values are close to the cost reported by 
users. Among farmers who responded 
to both questions, 22 farmers provided 
the same answer, while 9 farmers 
responded differently. 
Besides costs and incentive 
payments, farmers consider yield 
changes in their adoption decisions. 
Focusing on cover crop users, yield 
stayed the same among 12 farmers. 
Two farmers experienced a decrease 
in yield, while ϐive farmers had an 
increase. Lastly, ϐive users did not know 
whether the yield changed. Farmers 
were also asked about the risks, beneϐits, 
and barriers associated with planting 
cover crops. Twenty-ϐive farmers 
mentioned termination as a major risk 
associated with this practice. They 
appear concerned with its timing and 
process, which can affect the planting 
and subsequent growing of the cash 
crop in the spring. In fact, ϐive farmers 
expressed their apprehension regarding 
the delay in spring planting. In addition, 
9 farmers listed yield loss as a major risk 
associated with cover crops. Switching 
to beneϐits, 25 farmers mentioned 
improvements in reducing soil erosion, 
8 farmers stated improvements in soil 
health or soil quality, and 14 farmers 
listed the increase in organic matter as 
major beneϐits associated with cover 
crops. Only three farmers listed water 
quality improvements as a beneϐit of 
cover crops.    
When asked about barriers that 
prevent farmers from adopting cover 
crops, 19 farmers pointed to cost 
barriers. Regarding management 
barriers, 20 farmers said that the 
timing to plant cover crops is a major 
obstacle to establish this practice, since 
there is a short planting window and 
the growing season is very short. Eight 
farmers pointed to the additional time 
and labor required, and ϐive farmers 
identiϐied problems associated with 
terminating the cover crop as a barrier. 
These barriers are clearly connected 
to their perceived risks. Five farmers 
documented the lack of immediate 
beneϐits as something preventing 
farmers from adopting this practice. 
Lastly, eight farmers commented on 
the uncertainty associated with this 
practice or the lack of willingness 
to try to new methods as potential 
explanations for the lack of adoption. 
This small survey provides a 
ϐirst glance at adoption decisions and 
barriers of farmers who are familiar 
with cover crops. More research is 
needed to identify the right incentives 
that will spread this promising 
technology in Iowa.  
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FARM BILL programs run the gamut from crop insurance to 
conservation, from invasive species 
control to nutrition subsidies, from 
agricultural research to commodity 
subsidies. These programs fall into 
two broad categories. Some, such as 
the nutrition programs, commodity 
programs, and the crop insurance 
program have an objective of 
redistributing income from taxpayers to 
speciϐic groups of people. Others, such 
as agricultural research, conservation, 
and food inspection programs have 
an objective of improving economic 
efϐiciency by providing goods and 
services that the private sector under-
provides, or by mitigating undesirable 
market outcomes. The key decision 
that the Senate and House Agricultural 
Committees will need to make in the 
2018 Farm Bill is how to split up a ϐixed 
amount of funds between redistributive 
programs and those that improve 
efϐiciency.
Both types of programs can 
improve society. Agricultural research 
and food inspection programs have 
given us less expensive and safer food. 
Redistribution under the nutrition 
programs have a strong record of 
reducing the negative impacts of 
poverty on children and adults. 
However, just because Congress 
decides to fund a program does 
not imply that it improves society. 
For example, USDA’s Conservation 
Stewardship Program often makes 
payments to farmers for conservation 
practices that they are already doing. 
When this occurs, the only beneϐit of 
the program is a private beneϐit to 
farmers of more income. 
 Redistribution or Public Good: 
Which Direction for the New Farm Bill?
by Bruce Babcock
babcock@iastate.edu
It is easier to garner funding 
for programs that generate private 
beneϐits than public beneϐits for the 
simple reason that private beneϐiciaries 
have a strong incentive to spend money 
and exert efforts to push Congress to 
pass their favored programs. No such 
push comes when the beneϐits of a 
program are widely dispersed among 
all of us. This truth about how policy 
is formed is inconvenient for our 
elected representatives, so advocates 
of private beneϐit programs represent 
their favored program as improving 
society. Examples abound. Taxi 
companies and drivers ϐight for public 
intervention against Uber in the name 
of maintaining public safety when 
their real ϐight is against increased 
competition. Domestic manufacturers 
and unions regularly argue for taxing 
imports by invoking national security 
concerns or that foreign suppliers are 
unfairly subsidized. 
Supporters of farm subsidy 
programs never argue publically that 
income should be redistributed to 
farmers based on the fact that farmers 
are somehow especially deserving. 
Rather they couch arguments in terms 
that may have some public appeal. A 
common justiϐication for farm subsidies 
made by members of the Ag Committees 
is that they are needed to ensure an 
adequate food supply for Americans. A 
cursory look at this argument reveals 
its fallacy. According to USDA, only 46 
percent of US corn is used to feed US 
livestock or as a food ingredient. The 
rest is used to produce ethanol or is 
exported. Only 29 percent of US grain 
sorghum is fed to US livestock. About 
54 percent of US wheat, 59 percent of 
US rice, and 45 percent of US soybeans 
are used domestically. In aggregate, 
roughly half of US production of the 
commodities that receive subsidies is 
used to feed US livestock or produce 
US food. In addition, a growing amount 
of the corn, soybeans, wheat, and 
grain sorghum that is fed to domestic 
livestock is exported. About 26 percent 
of US produced pork, 14 percent of US 
milk solids, and about 16 percent of US 
broiler meat is exported. Rather than 
the US food supply being threatened, 
the United States is likely the most food 
secure country in the world. There 
simply is no association between US 
food security and farm payments. 
A desire to protect farmers 
from fi nancial stress is 
clearly a motivating factor 
for some supporters of 
farm payments. But such 
protection can be counter-
productive because 
fi nancial stress serves 
the economic purpose of 
signaling farmers that 
they need to change what 
they are doing. Response 
to market signals is what 
makes capitalism work. 
Continued on page 10
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THERE ARE plenty of alarming signs indicating a possible farm 
crisis: current corn prices are half 
the 2013 peak level of US $7/bushel; 
farm income has declined for major 
commodities (corn, wheat, cattle), 
falling from the previous year to levels 
well below recent years; weak farm 
income and worsening credit conditions 
continue to trim farmland values, 
which are expected to trend lower in 
the months ahead, thus weakening the 
equity position of producers and the 
collateral value for lenders. Given the 
heightening farm ϐinancial crisis, many 
agricultural lenders, academics, and 
other stakeholders in the US farm sector 
worry another farm crisis is looming. 
However, there are four economic and 
legal reasons why this farm downturn is 
unlikely to slide into a sudden collapse 
of agricultural markets.
Reason 1: Much stronger, real 
income accumulation before the 
current downturn
When debunking or conϐirming the 
idea of a farm crisis replay, it is useful 
to closely investigate the previous farm 
crises of the 1920s and 1980s, and it’s 
equally important to investigate the 
golden eras before them. Through that 
comparison, I argue that the much 
stronger income accumulation during 
the late 2000s, fueled by growing export 
demand from China, historically low 
interest rates, and the expanding biofuel 
market, puts agricultural producers and 
businesses a much better condition now 
to weather storms.
Table 1 presents the average annual 
percentage change in inϐlation-adjusted 
Iowa land values, gross and net farm 
income for the three golden eras, and 
 Four Reasons Why We Aren’t Likely to See a Replay 
of the 1980’s Farm Crisis
by  Wendong Zhang
wdzhang@iastate.edu 
farm downturns. While it is concerning 
to see that since 2013 gross and net 
cash income has decreased 4.5 percent 
and 9.8 percent per year, respectively, it 
is equally important to note that from 
2003 to 2013, gross and net income 
consistently grew 4.5 percent and 8.1 
percent every year, reaching almost 
record-high levels in both farm income 
and land values. Forecasted income 
for 2017 by USDA-Economic Research 
Service seems to suggest that farm 
income is stabilizing for Corn Belt states 
like Iowa.
A comparison between this third 
golden era and the two previous reveal 
that farmers accumulated much more 
income, especially cash, during the most 
recent decade than during the 1910s and 
1970s before those farm crises. Net cash 
income before the 1980s farm crisis is 
actually much smaller, even though land 
values skyrocketed during the same time. 
In other words, high commodity prices 
in the 2000s seem to have positioned 
agricultural producers nowadays to 
withstand the current headwinds.
Reason 2: Historically low
interest rates
Put simply, land value is the net present 
value of all discounted future income 
ϐlows. With certain assumptions 
imposed, one could think of land value 
being net income divided by interest 
(discount) rate. 
Low interest rates are favorable 
to keep the farmland market aϐloat: on 
the one hand, it encourages stronger 
loan demand due to lower interest 
payments, and on the other hand, low 
interest rates also signals that the 
returns for other competing assets, 
such as stocks and bonds, aren’t so 
robust that farmland investors are 
willing to accept a lower rate of return. 
Figure 1 reveals that even with recent 
hikes, interest rates are still very 
low compared to the 1980s, and the 
Federal Reserve is likely to raise the 
interest rate at a slow pace as opposed 
to a sudden hike, which makes loan 
restructuring possible for producers 
wanting to take advantage of current 
favorable interest rates. 
Table 1. Average Annual Percentage Change in Infl ation-adjusted 
Iowa Land Values and Farm Income
Note: The average land value change from 2013 to 2017 is approximate because 2017 land values are 
unknown. The 1910–1933 gross and net farm income changes are for the whole United States due to 
limited data at the state level. Land values are based on USDA Census of Agriculture and USDA NASS 
Land Value and Cash Rent Survey, while the data on farm income is from the USDA Economic Research 
Service Farm Income and Wealth Statistics database.

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Figure 2 speciϐically compares 
the average cash rent and annual 
mortgage payments per acre for a 
typical Iowa farmland loan under 
prevailing farmland loan interest rates 
and varying terms.1 It shows that due 
to abnormally high interest rates in 
the 1980s, the mortgage payment for 
a typical farmland loan was almost 
three times higher than the typical cash 
rent, and extending the farmland loan 
repayment schedules from 15 to 30 
years did almost nothing to alleviate the 
ϐinancial burden faced by landowners. 
However, under today’s low interest 
rate environment, debt restructuring 
is feasible and makes sense: under 
current prevailing farmland loan rates, 
extending a farmland loan from a 15 to 
30-year repayment schedule would cut 
the annual mortgage payment needed 
from over $350 per acre—higher than 
the 2016 cash rent of $230—to a level 
comparable to the typical cash rent. In 
fact, many lenders are now advising 
their clients to take advantage of the 
current favorable interest rates to secure 
repayment capacity. 
Reason 3: More prudent agricultural 
lending in part driven by more 
stringent regulations
The most striking aspect of the 1970s 
land boom during this high-inϐlation 
era is that debt capital largely ϐinanced 
the massive investment in agricultural 
assets. One reason is that loan 
requirements by lenders like Farmers 
Home Association were fairly lenient—it 
was not uncommon for agricultural 
lenders to give out large-cap loans up to 
80 or even 85 percent of the collateral 
value. What made it worse was the way 
collateral value was calculated—market 
value unadjusted for inϐlation, which 
means that the book value of collateral 
rose when inϐlation skyrocketed. Figure 
2 shows that both factors, in addition to 
high interest rates, contributed to the 
staggering agricultural debt and highly 
 Figure 1. Iowa Farmland Value and Farmland Loan Interest Rates 1969-2016
Figure 2. Cash Rent and Annual Mortgage Payments for Iowa Farmland 
Loans Under Prevailing Interest Rates
Figure 3. The Agricultural Liquidity, Profi tability and Solvency Ratios for the 
U.S. 1960 – 2016
Source: Farmland value data is from Iowa State University land value survey and the farmland loan 
interest rate is from the Federal Reserve bank at Chicago.
Source: Farmland value data is from Iowa State University land value survey (Zhang 2017), cash 
rent data is from the ISU cash rent survey, and the farmland loan interest rate is from the Federal 
Reserve bank at Chicago. 
Source: USDA Economic Research Service Farm Income and Wealth Statistics. Please use the right 
y-axis titles for the two dashed lines: total rate of return on farm assets, and debt to asset ratio.
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United States since 1960, and Figure 
4 shows agricultural loan delinquency 
rates since 1970. Although the current 
rate is rising, it is still well below the 
1980s farm crisis level. The proϐitability 
ratio, such as rate of return on farm 
assets, is now inching down, but is also 
higher than the 1980s levels. It is likely 
that with the current stagnation of 
commodity prices and continued decline 
in farm income, the debt service ratio 
will continue to rise and the proϐitability 
ratio remain ϐlat or decrease. However, 
it is more likely a liquidity and working 
capital problem, as opposed to a solvency 
problem. The balance sheet of the US 
farm sector is still very strong, which 
can be seen from the low level of debt to 
asset ratio in Figure 3. Similarly, although 
we see in Figure 4 the loan repayment 
index continued to decline, but the 
delinquency rates for both agricultural 
loans in general, as well as farmland 
loans, are still at very low levels.
Reason 4: Stronger government 
safety net
It is very important to point out the 
strength of the agricultural safety 
net—in 1987, only 50 million acres in 
the entire United States were insured 
in the Federal Crop Insurance program. 
Today, just the total cropland insured 
in Iowa exceeds 25 million acres, 
representing 93% of Iowa’s corn and 
soybean production acres (USDA RMA 
2015, for more information please see 
Crop Insurance in Iowa, http://www.
card.iastate.edu/ag_policy_review/
display.aspx?id=26). There is arguably 
stronger support from the livestock 
insurance program as well. In addition, 
payments from federal and state 
commodity programs and disaster relief 
programs provide signiϐicant revenue 
and price protection. The 1980s farm 
crisis represents the failure of the 
government’s safety test in the ‘stress 
leveraged agricultural sector. By 1978, 
the debt incurred averaged 76 percent 
of the purchase price, and between 1970 
and 1980, the amount of farm mortgage 
debt increased 59 percent. 
After the 1980s farm crisis, the 
regulations on agricultural lending 
limits got tighter, and agricultural banks 
reverted to a 65 percent loan-to-value 
ratio, which became an even more 
stringent 50 percent loan-to-value ratio 
after the 2007–2008 ϐinancial crisis. 
Nowadays, one more factor helps limit 
the amount of debt and leverage faced 
by the US agricultural sector—collateral 
value is often calculated using a cash 
ϐlow approach, as opposed to inϐlated 
market value. For example, in 2012 even 
though corn prices are approaching 
$7/bushel, the long-term average price 
of $4/bushel is often used by lenders 
like Farm Credit Service in calculating 
collateral value. 
Lower interest rates and more 
prudent lending practices deϐinitely help 
agricultural producers manage debts 
now. Figure 3 shows the agricultural 
liquidity and solvency ratios for the 
Figure 4. The Agricultural Loan Repayment Index and Delinquency Rates 
1970-2015
Source: Federal Reserve Bank (2017).
 Figure 5. Crop Insurance Coverage for U.S. 1986-2016
Continued on page 10
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test,’ however, agricultural producers 
and the farm sector in general now have 
a much stronger safety net compared to 
the 1980s.
Despite the deteriorating 
agricultural ϐinancial conditions and 
continued decline in farm income, 
the current farm downturn is more 
likely a liquidity and working capital 
problem, as opposed to a solvency 
and balance sheet problem for the 
entire agricultural sector. Rather than 
an abrupt farm crisis, we are likely 
experiencing a gradual, drawn-
out downward adjustment to the 
historical normal return levels for the 
agricultural economy.  
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Redistribution or Public Good: 
Which Direction for the New Farm Bill?
continued from page 6
Another frequent argument made 
for farm subsidies is that farming is 
a risky business and all that stands 
between a farmer and ϐinancial ruin 
are farm subsidies and the crop 
insurance program. Stam and Dixon 
(2002) showed that farm bankruptcy 
rates were only high in the 1930s 
and the mid-1980s, periods of severe 
ϐinancial stress in the farm sector. The 
annual rate of bankruptcy in the 1930s 
peaked at about 0.13 percent. In the 
mid-1980s the rate of bankruptcies 
was higher at 0.25 percent. Data on 
current bankruptcy rates are not 
readily available, but bankruptcy rates 
outside these two periods of extreme 
ϐinancial stress are below 0.03 percent. 
It is tempting to use this statistic to 
conclude that more than 99.97 percent 
of farm payments do not prevent 
bankruptcy, but it cannot be known 
for certain whether bankruptcy rates 
would be higher or lower without farm 
programs, outside periods of severe 
ϐinancial stress. Sufϐice it to say that 
outside periods of severe ϐinancial 
distress, the vast majority of farm 
payments do not prevent bankruptcy. 
A desire to protect farmers from 
ϐinancial stress is clearly a motivating 
factor for some supporters of farm 
payments. But such protection can be 
counter-productive because ϐinancial 
stress serves the economic purpose 
of signaling farmers that they need to 
change what they are doing. Response to 
market signals is what makes capitalism 
work. Current farm payment formulas 
use either ϐixed prices or past market 
prices to determine when payments are 
made. Some justify these formulas on the 
basis that farmers need to be protected 
from long-lasting declines in price; 
however, low prices signal that the world 
has abundant supplies. Buffering farmers 
from this market signal simply prolongs 
low-price periods.
The crop insurance program offers 
an alternative way of buffering farmers 
from ϐinancial stress. Although it is 
easy to identify changes to the program 
that would make it more efϐicient, 
the program’s overall structure has a 
number of positive attributes. Program 
guarantees adjust each year to pre-
planting time market price levels, so 
only unexpected declines in market 
prices or yields trigger payments. A 
minimum 15 percent deductible means 
that revenue must decline below 
expected levels before a payment is 
received. Lastly, although premiums 
are heavily subsidized, at least farmers 
must pay a portion of the cost of the 
program so years in which they do not 
receive a crop insurance indemnity, 
they end up sending their crop 
insurance company a payment.
The likelihood of Congress tilting 
their funding decisions away from 
redistributive commodity programs 
that beneϐit a small group of farmers 
towards programs that serve the 
public may not be zero, but it is close 
to it. This low likelihood reϐlects 
both the strength of the status quo in 
determining policy directions as well 
as the strength of the lobbying efforts 
that support redistribution. However, 
the recent House action cutting $840 
billion over 10 years from the Medicaid 
program demonstrates that status 
quo redistributive programs may not 
always win out. Whether a willingness 
to cut a redistributive program 
that beneϐits poor people augers a 
willingness to cut redistribution to 
relatively wealthy and high-income 
farmers will soon be seen.  
 Four Reasons Why We Aren’t Likely to See a 
Replay of the 1980’s Farm Crisis
continued from page 9
 1This calculation makes two assumptions: 
(a) the average land value and cash rent 
value from ISU surveys is used as proxy 
for gross income and asset/collateral 
value; and (b) it assumes certain loan-
to-value ratios based on regulations on 
agricultural lending and common lending 
practices, which we will discuss more in 
detail in Reason 3.
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agreements; and agriculture is one 
area that has deϐinitely beneϐitted from 
more open trade brought about by trade 
agreements and an area where the 
United States has traditionally enjoyed 
trade surpluses. 
Figure 1 shows the historical 
growth in US agricultural trade and 
the timing of these trade agreements. 
One thing to remember about most of 
the agreements is that the provisions 
are typically slowly rolled in over a 
number of years. For example, NAFTA 
was signed in 1994, but was not fully 
in effect until 2008. Agricultural trade 
was relatively small prior to the early 
1970s. The development of global 
agricultural trade in the mid-1970s 
boosted farm prices—agricultural 
trade values quadrupled during the 
decade. The impact of the 1980s farm 
crisis can be seen in the trade ϐlows as 
well. It was in the depths of that crisis 
that the United States signed its ϐirst 
free trade agreement with Israel in 
1985. NAFTA was agreed to in 1994. In 
the early 2000s, there was a ϐlurry of 
activity with multiple trade agreements 
being consummated. The latest set of 
agreements, with Colombia, Panama, 
and South Korea, were signed in 2012.
 Since the time of that ϐirst trade 
agreement, US agricultural exports have 
grown from $30 billion to the current 
total of $135 billion. Agricultural 
imports have grown as well, but not as 
quickly, moving from $20 billion in 1985 
to $115 billion in 2016. To highlight the 
impacts the free trade agreements have, 
Figure 2 breaks down US agricultural 
exports by partners (free trade 
agreement [FTA], China, and other non-
FTA). As the ϐigure shows, much of the 
growth in US agricultural exports has 
occurred with our free trade partners, 
with Canada and Mexico representing 
a substantial portion of that growth. 
Since 1985, US agricultural exports have 
averaged a 29 percent growth rate with 
our FTA partners. Over the same period, 
our agricultural exports have averaged 
a 7 percent growth rate with non-FTA 
countries, including China. Removing 
China from the non-FTA list slows the 
annual export growth rate to 5 percent.
More open and free trade has 
beneϐitted US agriculture, while it is 
not the only driver in export growth, 
as the growth in the US-China trade 
exhibits, it is a very signiϐicant factor, 
which makes sense from an economic 
perspective. Economic theory in 
trade outlines the idea of comparative 
advantage, the ability for an entity to 
produce a good or service at a lower 
cost than other entities competing 
with it. Different countries will have 
different products where they have 
a comparative advantage. Given the 
dispersion of comparative advantage 
across countries and products, trade can 
be mutually beneϐicial to all countries 
Ag Trade and Trade Agreements
continued from page 6
Figure 2. US Ag Exports 
Source: USDA-FAS
Figure 1. Value of US Agricultural Trade 
Source: USDA-FAS
Table 1. Countries with Trade Agreements with the United States 
Source: USDA-FAS  
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involved. Tariffs, border taxes, and other 
trade-restricting policies distort cost 
structures and thus, distort comparative 
advantages and trade ϐlows.
In the case of agriculture, the 
United States has a comparative 
advantage. We are the world’s largest 
producer of many agricultural products 
and have developed signiϐicant 
resources to transport our agricultural 
products throughout the country and 
around the world. Compared to other 
countries in the world, the United 
States is a high production, low cost 
source of agricultural products. As 
the ϐigures show, the removal of trade 
barriers, such as tariffs, via free trade 
agreements provides an economic 
boost to US agriculture.
Many of our agricultural products 
now rely on international demand as 
a major component of total demand. 
For the major Iowa crops, exports 
for the 2016/17 crops consume 15 
percent of US corn and 48 percent of 
US soybeans. However, other crops are 
just as, if not more, reliant on exports. 
Forty-ϐive percent of the US wheat crop 
is exported, along with 47 percent of 
US sorghum, 51 percent of US rice, and 
84 percent of US cotton. International 
trade is also important to the livestock 
and dairy industries. Twenty-one 
percent of all US pork is shipped to 
other countries, along with 10 percent 
of US beef, 17 percent of US broilers, 9 
percent of US turkeys, and 22 percent of 
US dairy. US agricultural production has 
expanded to match the demand we see 
from the rest of the globe.
So the chatter about the 
renegotiation of trade agreements has 
concerned many in US agriculture. The 
industry does not want to lose the gains 
of the previous couple of decades. Much 
of the new administration’s discussion 
of trade has highlighted sectors of 
the economy where the United States 
arguably does not have a comparative 
advantage. However, as Secretary 
Perdue enters his new role, he has 
moved to highlight the importance of 
trade for US agriculture by creating a 
new position in USDA, Undersecretary 
for Trade. The question for agriculture 
going forward is how strong a voice will 
USDA have as new trade talks begin. 
